Click here for the entire issue in PDF format
Letter from the Editor
Matthew Oresman
Thank you for joining us for the third edition of the new CEF Quarterly! From the feedback we have received so far, we think we are on the right track for this new form of publication. In our attempt to continue to push the envelope on this new and developing field of study, we have chosen to depart from our usual routine with this latest edition of the CEF Quarterly. Instead of our usual broad survey of China’s relationship with its Eurasian neighbors, we will focus on one of the most central aspects of this relationship: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). With the recent completion of the July 5 SCO Summit in Astana, the SCO celebrated one year of full operation.
The Shanghai Cooperation Summit: Where Do We Go From Here?
Matthew Oresman, with Zamir Chargynov reporting from Kazakhstan
On July 5, the Heads of States of Member Nations of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) gathered in the Kazakh capital Astana. The Summit brought together the Presidents of the six member states of the SCO: Nursultan Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan, President Kurmanbek Bakiev of Kyrgyzstan, Hu Jintao of China, Vladamir Putin of Russia, Emomali Rakhmonov of Tajikistan, and Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan. These six leaders were also joined by Mongolian President Nambaryn Enhbayar, whose country was given an observer status last year, as well as Vice-President Mohammad-Reza Aref of Iran, Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz of Pakistan, and Foreign Minister Manmohan Singh of Indian, all of which were granted observer status at this year’s summit. All together, these leaders represented over half the Earth’s population and land area.
The SCO in the Last Year
Zhao Huasheng
Over the last year, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) had made significant progress in four main areas: the establishment of permanent operating organs, the cultivation of its political image, progress in reforming the economic and trade situation of the SCO area, and the development of the SCO’s foreign relations. Yet with all this success, there is still much work that still much left be accomplished. But overall, the future of the SCO is bright.
The Shanghai Cooperative Organization: Post-Mortem or Prophecy
Stephen Blank
The more one examines the Shanghai Cooperative Organization (SCO) the more irreconcilable contradictions appear. A fundamental cornerstone of Chinese national security policy is to avoid all military alliances and blocs. Yet China was and is the moving spirit behind the creation of the SCO and its transformation into a genuine collective security organization. As its 2001 treaty makes clear, members pledge to send military assistance to other members if requested in the event an attack by separatists, terrorists, or fundamentalist Islamic organizations. In this respect, the treaty marks a fundamental break with previous Chinese policy since 1949. Furthermore, since 2001 China has been instrumental in conducting both bilateral military exercises with members like Kyrgyzstan and in 2005 with Russia, and multilateral anti-terrorist exercises in 2003 and 2004). Nobody has yet reconciled this contradiction.
The New SCO Observers: Making a Leap Forward in Cautious Augmentation
Pan Guang
The 5th summit meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) at Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan, achieved remarkable results, demonstrating that this four-year-old young organization has embarked on a new course of pragmatic development. Making a leap forward in cautious augmentation, the SCO is now showing a more active posture in safeguarding security and promoting economic development in the region, caring about the situation in areas around Central Asia like Middle East and South Asia, and participating in the world affairs.
East vs. West? Some Geopolitical Questions and Observations for the SCO
Farkhad Tolipov
One a year has passed since the official announcement in June 2004 that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization finalized its full structurization. Many events – both positive and negative – happened since then in the SCO “zone of responsibility,” events that might, at first glance, shed on the future development of the organization. However, neither of the two SCO organs, the Secretariat in Beijing nor the RATS in Tashkent, are ready yet to meet the challenges of the region nor those posed by recent events. Furthermore, the SCO’s conceptual base and overall mission still remain vague.
Russia and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A Difficult Match
Dmitri Trenin
One year after Beslan, Moscow is looking south with growing apprehension. While there is no war in Chechnya in the usual sense of the word, there is no peace either, and despite the election of a loyalist president last fall and the promise of parliamentary elections later this year, the situation is not improving. Worse, the areas around Chechnya are getting restive. Daghestan is teetering on the brink of a civil war, Lebanon-style. Karachaevo-Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria are rent by internal tensions, and North Ossetia and Ingushetia are still divided by a bloody armed conflict, now 13 years old. While the talk, after Beslan, was to come up with a set of socio-economic measures to deal with the roots of the region-wide crisis, the decision now, a year later, is to send more troops to the North Caucasus. A top Kremlin aide has characterized the situation as a “subterranean fire.”
Guiding the ‘Near Abroad’ – Russia and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
Alexander White
The recent summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which concluded in Kazakhstan on July 5th, marks a significant step in Russian attempts to use multilateral structures in order to retain a guiding role in Central Asia. The summit came against the backdrop of serious unrest in both Uzbekistan and Kyrgzstan, and widespread concern within the Russian policy elite that this could lead to regional contagion. Despite these major challenges to regional order, Russia comes out of the July summit in a far stronger position than it was in at the beginning of the year. The Kremlin has achieved three critical objectives – accommodation with the new Kyrgyz regime, a greater acceptance of its regional role from Uzbekistan, and the beginnings of momentum aimed at reducing the US presence in the region. It does so at the cost of allowing deeper and broader Chinese engagement within Central Asia.
Central Asian Water Resources and the Future of the SCO
Li Lifan and Liu Jingqian
Water is an essential resource for human lives, and the question of how to develop the water resource through cooperation is becoming one of the important factors of security problems. Since a contest for the water resource in the Central Asia might become a trigger of conflicts in this area, we should pay more attention to the management of the water resource among the Central Asian countries. Since the SCO was founded in 2001, economic cooperation has become more and more important. The 2004 SCO Tashkent Summit declaration clearly expressed that the SCO was playing an increasingly important role in and paying more attention to economic cooperation, environment protection, and the development of water resource. Since the Summit, the SCO has begun to play a more active role in managing the region’s scarce water supplies.
A Victory for China’s New Security Concept: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization
Peter Mattis
When China’s new security concept (xin anquan guan) first appeared in 1996, observers derided it as naïvely optimistic and more normative than practical. To many, the new security concept demonstrated the inexperience and lack of maturity in Chinese foreign policy. China’s first clumsy overtures toward Southeast Asia reinforced this analysis, but undaunted the Chinese continued their diplomatic efforts dropping the anti-hegemony rhetoric. The original “Shanghai Five” seemed an ill-fated effort following the resolution of many of the territorial disputes in Central Asia, and so it was until the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks focused international attention on the region. Driven by energy concerns and a number of failed attempts to obtain oil contracts, China reemerged in the region pushing the rejuvenation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).
